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Abstract: Power systems based on renewable energy sources (RES) are characterised by 
increasingly distributed, volatile and uncertain supply leading to growing requirements for 
flexibility. In this paper, we explore the role of demand response (DR) as a source of flexibility 
that is considered to become increasingly important in future. The majority of research in this 
context has focussed on the operation of power systems in energy only markets, mostly using 
deterministic optimisation models. In contrast, we explore the impact of DR on generator 
investments and profits from different markets, on costs for different consumers from 
different markets, and on CO2 emissions under consideration of the uncertainties associated 
with the RES generation. We also analyse the effect of the presence of a feed-in premium 
(FIP) for RES generation on these impacts. We therefore develop a novel stochastic mixed 
complementarity model in this paper that considers both operational and investment 
decisions, that considers interactions between an energy market, a capacity market and a 
feed-in premium and that takes into account the stochasticity of electricity generation by RES. 
We use a Benders decomposition algorithm to reduce the computational expenses of the 
model and apply the model to a case study based on the future Irish power system. We find 
that DR particularly increases renewable generator profits. While DR may reduce consumer 
costs from the energy market, these savings may be (over)compensated by increasing costs 
from the capacity market and the feed-in premium. This result highlights the importance of 
considering such interactions between different markets.
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1. Introduction
The rapid expansion of electricity generation from renewable energy sources (RES-E) leads to an in-
creasingly distributed, volatile and uncertain energy supply. The increasing volatility comes along with
growing flexibility requirements. Meeting these increasing requirements by conventional supply side or stor-
age technologies alone will ultimately be inefficient or not possible at all. Demand response (DR) is another
source providing the required flexibility, which is expected to become increasingly important (Albadi and
El-Saadany, 2008; Palensky and Dietrich, 2011; De Jonghe et al., 2012; Siano, 2014).
In terms of quantifying impacts and benefits of DR, many researchers have focussed on power system
operations in energy only markets so far (e.g. Su and Kirschen, 2009; Hu et al., 2016), often using deterministic
models. However, since DR changes the profile of the load to be covered by the power system, one can also
expect that it has an impact on the optimal power plant portfolio and, hence, on generation investments. In
countries where other markets or payment mechanisms exist in addition to the energy market (e.g., a capacity
market rewarding dispatchable capacity or a feed-in premium (FIP) rewarding RES-E generation) this means
that the interactions between the different markets need to be considered when analysing the impact of DR
on investment decisions. Moreover, since RES-E generation is not just volatile but also uncertain, one can
further expect that this uncertainty, which is often ignored (O’Connell et al., 2014), affects the impact of DR
on power system operation and investments. In such an environment, we are therefore particularly interested
in exploring how DR affects generator investments and profits from different markets, how it affects the costs
for different consumers from different markets, and how it affects CO2 emissions. Moreover, we explore how
the availability of a FIP for RES-E generation changes each of these impacts. Finally, we analyse what the
benefits of a stochastic optimisation approach are over a deterministic one.
To analyse these questions, we present a stochastic Mixed Complementarity Problem (s-MCP) specifically
developed for the analysis in this paper. In contrast to previous works, the MCP considers both operational
and investment decisions, interactions between an energy market, a capacity market and a feed-in premium
while the model also accounts for the stochasticity of RES. The MCP models the optimisation problems
of different electricity market players and thus, also allows different generation firms and consumer groups
to be distinguished. The individual optimisation problems of each player are solved simultaneously and in
equilibrium. MCPs allow both primal variables (e.g., power generation) and dual variables (e.g., prices)
to be constrained together (Gabriel et al., 2012). They have been used to model various types of energy
markets (Hobbs, 2001; Gabriel et al., 2009; Huppmann, 2013; Egging, 2013; Lynch and Devine, 2017; Devine
et al., 2016; Devine and Bertsch, 2017; Nolan et al., 2017). For instance, Ehrenmann and Smeers (2011)
consider capacity expansion using a stochastic equilibrium model, however, they do not explicitly consider
DR. De Jonghe et al. (2012) analyse the impact of DR on the optimal generation portfolio using a MCP but
they do not consider uncertainty of RES-E supply, capacity markets or the effects of a FIP. Moreover, they
do not distinguish between different consumer groups and focus on one RES-E source (wind) only.
The players we consider on the supply side include power generating firms with different generation
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portfolios, i.e. specialised baseload, midload and peakload firms as well as a specialised RES firm and an
integrated firm with generation capacity across all considered technologies. RES supply is considered as
uncertain in the model. All firms maximise their profits by optimising the dispatch of their existing assets
and making investments into new conventional and/or renewable generation under consideration of the RES
uncertainty. Firms earn revenues from an energy market and a quantity-based capacity market. Firms with
RES-E generation earn additional revenues from the FIP in those cases where we consider this is available.
On the demand side, we consider a number of different consumer groups, including commercial/industrial
as well as residential consumers. We also distinguish between traditional consumers and prosumers, i.e.
consumers that have their own generation from solar PV modules. Since the PV supply is also uncertain
and the different RES supply profiles (e.g., wind and PV) and their uncertainties are correlated spatially
and temporally, we consider this correlation when generating input data for the model. All consumers in our
model choose, within given constraints, how much of their load to shift in order to meet their demand at
minimum costs. We hypothesise that there will be an aggregator who acts on behalf of the consumers (Good
et al., 2017; Cesen˜a et al., 2015; Burger et al., 2016) with the objective of minimising their energy supply
costs since, in reality, most consumers would not want to decide themselves whether or not and when to shift
any load. In order to manage the computational complexity of the model, we use a Benders decomposition
approach of the MCP based on Gabriel and Fuller (2010) and Egging (2013). We apply this model to a
case study based on data for the Irish power system in 2025, which has a high penetration of wind power
and a significant presence of smart meters (Comission for Energy Regulation, 2014) allowing consumers or
aggregators on their behalf to react quickly to short-term changes in the wholesale market.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In section 2, we introduce the mathematical model.
In section 3, we describe the data of our case study and the approach for generating consistent ensembles of
correlated wind and PV data. In section 4, we present our findings. In section 5, we discuss and interpret
the results before concluding the paper in section 6. In Appendix A, we present the firms’ and the con-
sumers’ Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions; information about the Benders decomposition is provided
in Appendix B.
2. Methodology
In this section, the methodology is described. We develop a stochastic MCP to represent an electricity
market with two types of players: generation firms and electricity consumer groups.
Firms receive revenues from energy and capacity markets as well as a FIP and seek to maximise their
profits. They may hold multiple generating units with the technologies considered being baseload, mid merit,
peakload and wind. In Section 3 we consider different wind regions of Ireland with varying, but correlated,
hourly capacity factors. Wind for the different regions are represented in the model as different technologies,
i.e., wind from one region is considered as a different technology from wind in another region. Firms are
distinguished by the initial generating portfolio they hold but may also invest in additional capacity in any
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Table 1: Indices and sets.
f ∈ F Generating firms
t ∈ T Generating technologies
p ∈ P Time periods
k ∈ K Consumers groups
s ∈ S Scenarios
h ∈ H Time steps in storage/load shifting period
p′ ∈ P ′ = {1, |H|+ 1, 2|H|+ 1, ...} ⊆ P Index representing starting points for storage period
i ∈ I Iterations of Benders Decomposition algorithm
Note: sets contain a finite amount of non-zero natural numbers while |H| represents the cardinality of H.
Table 2: Variables.
Firms’ primal variables
genf,t,p,s Generation from firm f with technology t in period p and scenario s
capbidf,t Capacity bid of firm f with technology t
invf,t Investment in new generation capacity for firm f with technology t
exitf,t Decommissioning of old generation capacity for firm f with technology t
Consumers’ primal variables
glsk,p,s Load shedding from consumer group k in period p and scenario s
gupk,p,s Electricity stored for later time point from consumer group k in period p and scenario s
gdownk,p,s Electricity used from storage from consumer group k in period p and scenario s
gmicrok,p,s Micro generation from consumer group k in period p and scenario s
gpvk,p,s PV generation from consumer group k in period p and scenario s
Dual variables
γp,s System price for time period p and scenario s
κ Unit capacity price
λ#. Lagrange multipliers associated with constraint # of the firms’ problem
µ#. Lagrange multipliers associated with constraint # of the firms’ problem consumers’ problem
Note: ’.’ is used as a place-holder as the subscripts for both Lagrange multipliers vary depending the on constraint.
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Table 3: Parameters.
PRs Probability associated with scenario s
MTCt Maintenance cost form generating technology t
CAPf,t Initial generating capacity for firm f with technology t
DREFk,p Reference demand for consumer group k in period p and scenario s
LOSSk Storage loss factor for consumer group k
GLS,MAXk Maximum load shedding for consumer group k in any time period or scenario
INTSTORk Electrical storage/ load shifting capacity for consumer group k
INTMICROk Micro generation capacity for consumer group k
INTPVk PV generating capacity for consumer group k
FACSTORk Percentage of electrical storage capacity electricity consumer group k can use in each period and
scenario
NORMPVp,s PV generating profile for period p and scenario s
NORMGf,t,p,s Generating profile for firm f with technology t in period p and scenario s
TARGET Capacity target for overall market
Xt Feed-In premium for technology t
XPV Feed-In premium for PV
DRt De-rating factor for technology t
A.. Intercept associated with marginal cost functions
B.. Slope associated with marginal cost functions
CPVk,p Marginal cost of using PV generation for consumer group k in period p
ICGENt Investment in generating technology t cost
Table 4: Functions.
CGENt (.) Marginal cost function for technology t
CLSk,p(.) Load shedding operational cost for consumer group k in period p
CMICROk,p (.) Operational cost of using micro generation for consumer group k in period p
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of these technologies. In this paper, all firms are modelled as price-takers, i.e., we assume that no firm may
exert market power.
The capacity payment mechanism is a quantity based mechanism. Under such a framework, a policy
maker, regulator or Transmission System Operator (TSO), exogenously selects a quantity of capacity required
for a given period (eg., one year). An auction is held wherein generators submit capacity bids and the total
amount sold equal the MW target. Generation firms compete in the auction to hold the options and therefore
gain a fixed sum of money per the time period considered to compensate them for each installed unit of
capacity.
Consumers seek to minimise the cost of meeting their demand. They may generally do so by utilising a
range of possible demand-side flexibility measures, such as load shedding, load shifting or electrical storage,
PV generation or thermal micro generation. We do not model individual consumers but rather consider
different consumer groups whose decisions represent the aggregate actions of consumers in these groups.
Consumer groups are distinguished by different levels of demand-side flexibility capability and whether they
represent industrial/commercial or residential consumers.
The stochasticity of the model arises from the uncertainty surrounding wind and PV power. Thus, each
scenario in our model represents different RES generation profiles, i.e. varying levels of wind and solar power
availability at each point in time. Each of the generation firms and consumer groups considered have separate
optimisation problems that are connected through market clearing conditions. The stochastic MCP is made
up of these market clearing conditions along with the KKT conditions for optimality from each of the players.
Thus, the MCP solves the optimisation problem of each player simultaneously and in equilibrium. The KKT
conditions are presented in Appendix A.
Throughout this section the following conventions are used: lower-case Roman letters indicate indices or
primal variables, upper-case Roman letters represent parameters (i.e., data, functions), while Greek letters
indicate prices or dual variables1. The variables in parentheses alongside each constraint in this section are
the Lagrange multipliers associated with those constraints.
2.1. Firm f ’s problem
Firm f maximises its expected profits (revenues less cost) by choosing the amount of generation (genf,t,p,s),
capacity bid (capbidf,t ), investment in new capacity (invf,t) and decommissioning of existing capacity (exitf,t).
It considers revenues received from a capacity and an energy market as well as a FIP for RES generation.
Its costs include generation costs and investment costs in addition to costs incurred for maintaining all of its
1The exceptions to these conventions can be found in Appendix B where variables with and index i or M represent parameters
derived from variables.
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units. Firm f ’s optimisation problem is:
max
genf,t,p,s,cap
bid
f,t ,
invf,t,exitf,t
∑
t,p,s
(
PRs × genf,t,p,s ×
(
γp,s +Xt − CGENt (genf,t,p,s)
))−
∑
t
(
ICGENt × invf,t +
(
invf,t + CAPf,t − exitf,t
)×MTCt)+∑
t
DRt × κ× capbidf,t ,
(1a)
subject to:
genf,t,p,s ≤ (CAPf,t + invf,t − exitf,t)×NORMGf,t,p,s, ∀t, p, s, (λ1f,t,p,s), (1b)
capbidf,t ≤ CAPf,t + invf,t − exitf,t, ∀t, (λ2f,t), (1c)
where t represents the different generating technologies, p represents timesteps and s represents different RES
scenarios of the stochastic optimisation problem. The parameters ICt and MTCt are cost of investment and
maintenance for technology t respectively. The marginal cost of generating with technology t is
CGENt (x) = A
GEN
t +B
GEN
t x, (2)
which means the overall cost of generating with technology t is quadratic.
The parameters Xt, PRs and DRt represent the feed-in premium associated with technology t, the
probability associated with scenario s and the de-rating factor associated with technology t respectively. In
this work a de-rating factor reflects the proportion of its overall capacity a technology can provide to meet
the capacity target. In Section 3 we assume DRt = 1 for conventional technologies i.e., baseload, mid merit
and peakload, and DRt = 0 for RES generation. This is because we assume conventional technologies are
always available for generation while RES generation, at times, is not available at all for generation.
The parameter CAPf,t is the initial installed capacity firm f has for technology t while NORM
G
f,t,p,s
represents the availability for technology t in timestep p and scenario s for firm f . As with the de-rating
factors, we assume NORMGf,t,p,s = 1 ∀f, t, p, s for conventional generation. For RES generation, NORMGf,t,p,s
takes a value between zero and one depending on the timestep and scenario representing the intermittency
and uncertainty of RES generation (which is basically generation from wind power in this paper as we consider
solar PV power only as part of some of the consumers’ problems).
Constraint (1b) ensures that firm f with technology t cannot generate more than its capacity times its
capacity factor, while constraint (1c) ensures it cannot make a capacity bid greater than the installed capacity.
Each of firm f ’s primal (decision) variables are also constrained to be non-negative.
The energy price at each period and scenario is γp,s. As each firm is modelled as a price-taker, generation
decision variables cannot affect this price. Consequently, γp,s is exogenous to firm f ’s problem. However, it
is a variable of the overall problem determined via the market clearing condition (6a). The capacity price
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paid for each unit of installed capacity is κ. It is also exogenous to firm f ’s problem but is a variable of
the overall problem, determined via the market clearing condition (6b). Note that RES generators are not
able to participate in the capacity market in this paper. Firm f ’s problem is convex, assuming all values for
BGENt are non-negative.
2.2. Consumer group k’s problem
Consumer group k seeks to minimise the cost of meeting their expected demand. In our model they are
generally able to choose from a range of demand side flexibility measures:
1. Load shedding : consumer group k may reduce their demand at any period p or scenario s The decision
variable that represents the amount they do so by is glsk,p,s.
2. Load shifting / electrical storage: consumer group k may also shift some of their demand and obtain less
from the grid. In the model we consider shifting in a similar way as electrical storage where consumers
may obtain electricity from electrical storage. Storing/shifting electricity and using electricity to meet
demand in period p and scenario s are represented by the decision variables gupk,p,s and g
down
k,p,s , respectively.
3. Thermal micro generation: instead of obtaining electricity from the grid, consumers may obtain elec-
tricity from their own micro-generation unit. The decision variable that represents the amount they do
so by is gmicrok,p,s .
4. Photovoltaic (PV) generation: instead of obtaining electricity from the grid, consumers may also obtain
electricity from their own PV-generation unit. The decision variable that represents the amount they
do so by is gpvk,p,s. In contrast to micro-generation, the availability of PV power varies across timesteps
and scenarios similar to that of wind power (see section 2.1).
Consumer group k’s optimisation problem is:
min
glsk,p,s,g
up
k,p,s,g
down
k,p,s ,
gmicrok,p,s ,g
pv
k,p,s
∑
s,p
PRs
(
γp,s ×
(
DREFk,p − glsk,p,s + gupk,p,s − (1− LOSSk)gdownk,p,s − gmicrok,p,s − gpvk,p,s
)
−XPV × gpvk,p,s + glsk,p,s × CLSk,p(glsk,p,s) + gmicrok,p,s × CMICROk,p (gmicrok,p,s ) + gpvk,p,s × CPVk,p
) (3a)
subject to
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glsk,p,s ≤ GLS,MAXk , ∀p, s, (µ1k,p,s), (3b)
gupk,p,s ≤ FACSTORk × INT STORk , ∀p, s, (µ2k,p,s), (3c)
gdownk,p,s ≤ FACSTORk × INT STORk , ∀p, s, (µ3k,p,s), (3d)
gmicrok,p,s ≤ INTMICROk , ∀p, s, (µ4k,p,s), (3e)
gpvk,p,s ≤ NORMPVp,s × INTPVk , ∀p, s, (µ5k,p,s), (3f)
p′+h−1∑
e=p′
(
gupk,e,s − gdownk,e,s
) ≤ INT STORk , ∀s, p′, h, (µ6k,p′,h,s), (3g)
p′+h−1∑
e=p′
(
gdownk,e,s − gupk,e,s
) ≤ 0, ∀s, p′, h, (µ7k,p′,h,s), (3h)
glsk,p,s + (1− LOSSk)gdownk,p,s + gmicrok,p,s + gpvk,p,s ≤ DREFk,p + gupk,p,s, ∀p, s, (µ8k,p,s), (3i)
where DREFk,p represents consumer groups k’s reference demand for period p. This is the demand consumer
group k would have in the absence of any demand side flexibility measures. The parameter LOSSk is a
percentage that represents the loss factor associated with storing electricity for consumer group k (which we
assume equals zero for load shifting), while XPV is the FIP associated with PV generation.
The marginal cost functions associated with load shedding and micro generation are (Devine and Bertsch,
2017):
CLSk,p(x) = A
LS
k,p +B
LS
k,px, (4)
CMICROk,p (x) = A
MICRO
k,p +B
MICRO
k,p x, (5)
respectively while CPVk,p represents the marginal costs of PV generation.
The parameter GLS,MAXk is the maximum amount of electricity that consumer group k can shed their
load by in each period and scenario while INTMICROk and INT
PV
k represent the micro generation and PV
generation capacity, respectively, consumer group k holds. Furthermore, the parameter INT STORk represents
the amount of electricity consumer group k may keep in storage while FACSTORk represents the percentage
that consumer group k can use of their storage in each period and scenario.
The parameter NORMPVp,s represents the generating profile of PV power for time period p and scenario
s. Similar to NORMGf,t,p,s for wind power, it takes a value between zero and one depending on the timestep
and scenario and thus represents the uncertainty and intermittency of PV power.
Constraints (3b) - (3f) constrain the amount electricity consumer group k can generate or store in time
period p and scenario s. Constraint (3g) ensures consumer group k cannot, over a |H|-timestep period, store
more electricity than its storage capacity (or cannot increase load for shifting by more than a predefined
limit). The index h presents timesteps in a |H|-timestep period while the index p′ represents starting points
for the storage period, i.e., p′ ∈ P ′ = {1, |H| + 1, 2|H| + 1, ...} ⊆ P . Constraint (3h) ensures consumer
group k cannot, over the same |H|-step time period, use more electricity for meeting demand than what
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has already been stored (or cannot decrease load for shifting by more than a predefined limit). Constraints
(3g) and (3h) also ensure that any electricity stored in a |H|-timestep period cannot be used in any other
|H|-timestep period. In reality, if a consumer stores electricity, they will be able to use it in any time period
in the future. However, because we set |H| = 48 in Section 2.4, we believe this simplification is reasonable
given the daily trough and peak structure of electricity demand. In addition, this simplification reduces the
size and complexity of the model and hence increases computational efficiency.
Constraint (3i) ensures any electricity consumer group k generate on their own, either from PV, storage,
or micro-generation, must be less than their reference demand plus any increased consumption due to storing
electricty. In other words, consumer group k’s own generation cannot be used to meet other consumers’
demand in this paper. However, for the chosen specification of the case study in this paper, this constraint
will not be binding. All of consumer group k’s primal (decision) variables are also constrained to be non-
negative. As with firm f ’s problem, γp,s is exogenous to consumer k’s problem but is a variable of the overall
problem, determined via the market clearing condition (6a).
Consumer group k’s problem is convex, assuming all values for BLSk,p and B
MICRO
k,p are non-negative.
2.3. Market clearing conditions
The |F |+ |K| optimisation problems are connected via the following market clearing conditions:∑
f,t
genf,t,p,s =
∑
k
(
DREFk,p − glsk,p,s + gupk,p,s − LOSSkgdownk,p,s − gmicrok,p,s − gpvk,p,s
)
, ∀p, s, (γp,s), (6a)
∑
f,t
DRt × capbidf,t = TARGET, (κ), (6b)
Market clearing condition (6a) ensures that the total amount of electricity generated by the firms must
equal the sum of the consumers’ demand. Consumers’ demand consists of their reference demand plus any
electricity they shift/store less any electricity they shed or generate themselves. Market clearing condition
(6b) ensures that the capacity bids of the firms must equal the capacity target level. The variables γp,s and
κ are the prices and free Lagrange multiplier associated with conditions (6a) and (6b) respectively.
As each of the optimisation problems are convex, the KKT conditions are both necessary and sufficient
for optimality for each type of player (Gabriel et al., 2012). Thus, the stochastic MCP consists of conditions
(A.1) - (A.19) (see Appendix A) in addition to the market clearing conditions (6).
2.4. Solving the problem
For computational efficiency, the MCP is solved using a Benders Decomposition. The Benders Decom-
position algorithm used in this paper is described in detail in Appendix B. It follows those used to solve
MCPs in Egging (2013) and Gabriel and Fuller (2010); the overall scheme is presented in Appendix B.1. The
decomposition involves two steps:
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1. The MCP is solved for a selection of 24 days in hourly resolution. These days represent 8-day periods
in winter, spring/autumn and summer, resulting in a total of 24 × 8 × 3 = 576 hourly time steps.
We choose 8-day periods, instead of 7-day periods (weeks), to ensure an even number of days in each
period. This is because we choose H = 48 timesteps for each storage/load shifting period and thus
require an even number of days to ensure there is equal amount of timesteps in each storage/load
shifting period. The revenues and costs from each hour in the objective function of each player are
multiplied by weighting factors of 11.375, 22.750 or 11.625 depending on whether that hour represents
a week in winter, spring/autumn or summer, respectively. This ensures that the 576 hourly time steps
represent a full year of 8784 hours. To determine the weighting factors we divided the whole year into
seasons and assigned 91 days (13 weeks) to winter, spring and autumn respectively and 93 days to
summer. To reduce the computational intensity of the model, spring and autumn are represented by
the same week explaining the higher weighting factor of the time steps representing these seasons.
For the first step, a Benders Decomposition algorithm is used to solve the MCP. Benders Decomposition
is a solution algorithm that has been shown to solve stochastic MCPs in a computational efficent manner
(Egging, 2013; Gabriel and Fuller, 2010). Instead of solving for all variables simultaneously it divides
the MCP into multiple smaller MCPs and solves the overall problem iteratively. At each iteration, a
first-stage master problem MCP is solved for a subset of variables. The values of the remaining variables
are determined by second-stage sub-problem MCPs.
In the model presented above, the different timesteps and scenarios are connected through the in-
vestment, exit and capacity bid variables. If these primal variables are fixed to specific values, the
model could be solved for each period and scenario separately. Hence these variables are the first-stage
variables and are also known as the complicating variables.
The master problem MCP of this work is presented in Appendix B.2. Its initial constraints are those of
the overall problem that involves these variables. Constraints not involving any of these variables are
not included in the master problem MCP. At each iteration, new constraints, known as Benders cuts, are
added to the master problem MCP using the results from the preceding sub-problems. Consequently,
the solution obtained is improved at each iteration. The algorithm stops when the first-stage variables
produced by the master problem stop changing. A metric derived in Gabriel and Fuller (2010) is used
to measure this convergence; see Appendix B.3.
The sub-problem MCPs can be represented by the overall MCP presented in Section 2. However, each
sub-problem is solved with investment, exit and capacity bid variables fixed at the values determined
by the master problem MCP of the same iteration. The second-stage variables are all scenario specific
and, in this work, are the firms’ generation variables in addition to each of the consumers’ variables.
2. The optimal investment, exit and capacity bid variables from the first step are fixed as parameters in
the second step. The MCP is then solved 93 times, each time representing a different 48-hour period in
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a 366-day year. As before, we choose a 366-day year to ensure an even number of days and thus ensure
there is an equal amount of timesteps in each 48-hour storage/load shifting period. As inter-temporal
constraints do not exceed beyond 48 hours, splitting the MCP into smaller problems is equivalent to
solving a single MCP with 8784 timesteps, assuming investment and exit decisions are fixed. However,
splitting the problem up into multiple smaller problems is more computationally efficient (Devine et al.,
2016). In addition, we believe it is reasonable to assume that investment/exit decisions are taken at
times separate to generation, storage/shifting and load shedding decisions.
The outputs of the model are the optimal investment, exit and capacity bid decisions from the first step
and the optimal generation, load shedding and load shifting / storage decisions and resulting prices from the
second step. From this model output, it is straightforward to calculate consumer costs, generators profits
and CO2 emissions as well as RES share and curtailment.
3. Case study data
We apply the model described in section 2 to a case study based on the future Irish power system. For
this purpose, we mainly use data for 2025 from EirGrid (2016). We also assume a significant presence of
smart meters (Comission for Energy Regulation, 2014), allowing aggregators (Good et al., 2017; Cesen˜a et al.,
2015; Burger et al., 2016) to respond to short-term changes in the market on behalf of the consumers with
the objective of minimising their energy supply costs. In order to explore the impact of DR on generator
investment decisions and profits, on consumer costs and on emissions and to understand how these impacts
are affected by the presence of a FIP, we run the market model four times (with vs. without the possibility
of load shifting combined with the presence vs. absence of a FIP) and compare the results (see section 4).
On the basis of EirGrid (2016), we assume a high penetration of RES-E in the system we study, namely 4800
MW of installed wind capacity and 50 MW of solar PV. For our case study, we assume that the installed wind
capacity is owned and operated by firms on the supply side, while the installed PV capacity is installed on
the demand side (where 30 MW are owned by households and 20 MW by industrial consumers). In terms of
additional investments in renewable capacity, we only consider investments on the supply side (i.e. wind) in
this paper and keep the installed PV capacity constant. Since the considered sources of renewable electricity
are both volatile and uncertain, and, moreover, their uncertainties are correlated spatially and temporally, it
is important to consider these correlations when generating input data for the stochastic market model. We
therefore present our approach for providing normalised, hourly wind (NORMGf,t,p,s) and PV (NORM
PV
p,s )
capacity factor time series in section 3.1 below. Subsequently, we describe the conventional supply side data
used in our model in section 3.2 and the demand side data in section 3.3.
3.1. Renewable power generation data
Data from the MERRA2 reanalysis (Bosilovich et al., 2016) were used to generate wind and PV data.
MERRA2 data have a grid spacing of around 55km on each horizontal level. The following hourly data were
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downloaded for years 1981 to 2015 inclusive, i.e. for a period of 35 years:
• SWGDN: surface incoming shortwave flux. Time-averaged hourly data (W/m2).
• T2M: 2-metre air temperature. Instantaneous hourly data (K).
• U2M/U10M/U50M: eastward wind at 2/10/50 metres above ground. Instantaneous hourly data (m/s).
• V2M/V10M/V50M: northward wind at 2/10/50 metres above ground. Instantaneous hourly data
(m/s).
Using these historical wind and PV data as a basis for our analysis ensures that the spatial and temporal
correlations from reality between wind and PV are preserved, which is an important requirement. The data
were retrieved at eight different MERRA2 grid points around Ireland (see Figure 1). These eight locations
correspond to the centres of the NUTS3 statistical regions of the Republic of Ireland and for each centre of
a region, the closest available MERRA2 grid point was chosen.
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South-East
Mid-West
Dublin
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MidlandWest
Border
Figure 1: MERRA2 grid point locations
3.1.1. Wind data calculations
MERRA2 wind speeds are available at heights above ground of 2 m, 10 m and 50 m. Recent wind farms
have hub heights of around 100 m, whereas hub heights of older wind farms are lower. In this study, a hub
height of 85 m was used at all eight locations, as a representative value.
MERRA 2 wind data were converted to wind power following the method used in Cradden et al. (2017)
and Cannon et al. (2015). First, a logarithmic wind profile was used to extrapolate wind speeds at 85 m above
ground from the input wind speeds at 2 m, 10 m and 50 m. Wind speed was then converted to wind capacity
factors NORMGf,t,p,s (where capacity factor = actual wind generation/installed rated capacity) using the
13
Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) 2013 wind power curve shown in Figure 2. Wind speeds below
3 m/s or above 30 m/s were assigned zero capacity factor.
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Figure 2: Wind speed to capacity factor curve (Ofgem, 2013).
3.1.2. PV data calculations
The MERRA2 variables SWGDN and T2M were used as input data to calculate PV generation profiles.
These variables are converted into power generation profiles using a physical PV model (Ritzenhoff, 1992;
Ruppert et al., 2016; Schwarz et al., 2018a,b). This model calculates electricity generation of solar PV
modules based on incident light, module efficiency and its orientation described by longitude, latitude, tilt and
azimuth of the modules. The model considers direct and diffuse solar radiation and the ambient temperature
to determine accurate module efficiencies. Furthermore, the albedo effect and average losses (e.g., cable or
inverter losses and losses from shadowing or module mismatching) are taken into account. For reasons of
simplicity, we assume a south orientation of the modules only. The inclination angle is set to 39°based on
Bertsch et al. (2017). This model calculates normalised hourly PV generation values NORMPVp,s .
3.1.3. Time series clustering of wind and PV
Despite the fact that we apply Benders Decomposition, it would be computationally intractable to consider
the RES data of all 35 years in our stochastic market model. Therefore, the task in this section is to take
the hourly bivariate time series of 35 years of (normalised) wind and PV, and to cluster these into a set of
relatively few representative years.
For this purpose, and this purpose only, the hourly data for wind and PV were equally weighted across
all eight stations and summed to give a total RES value including wind and PV for each hour from 1981 to
2015. Consequently, the data initially consisted of 306,792 hourly observations. This was trimmed down to
306,600 with the removal of the 29th February in leap years to ensure the same number of data points in
each year.
We use the R package tsclust (Montero et al., 2014) to cluster similar years of the time series.2 The
2See: http://www.jstatsoft.org/v62/i01/.
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package works by creating a distances matrix of years, and subsequently running a clustering method from
the distance matrix. The creation of the distance matrix is a key step, and we explored a number of different
versions. We chose the periodogram approach (Caiado et al., 2006) as, in the exploratory data analysis, we
noticed that the periodicity across year, month and day, was one of the most variable features of the data
set.
Once the distances matrix between years was created, we used a standard hierarchical complete-linkage
cluster method (Mardia et al., 1980) to judge the relatedness of the different time series years. We use the
standard cluster-persistence approach to determine the optimal number of clusters via a dendrogram.
The resulting dendrogram of the clustering is shown in Figure 3. The most persistent solution was that of
two clusters. We identified 1991, 2003/4, 2013, and 2015 in one cluster, with the remaining years in the other.
A four cluster solution was the next most persistent, but for simplicity we chose the two cluster version. A
plot of the time series contrasting the two sets of years shows that the first cluster tends to be more regular
(i.e. shows less yearly seasonality) compared with cluster 2.
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Figure 3: Dendrogram of clustered wind and PV years.
The clustering itself was based on identifying structural (dis)similarities between the 35 profiles. To
proceed with the model runs, we then chose representative years from each cluster. In a first step, we find
the yearly time series within each cluster that are the median Euclidean distance away from the time-wise
overall median. This method identified years 2004 and 1983 respectively, which also correspond to the median
capacity factors within each cluster. In a second step, to ensure that the set of representative profiles covers
a broad range of RES availability, we chose further years representative of the lower and upper tercile of the
total RES (wind and PV) capacity factor for each cluster. This leaves us with a total of six representative
time series, which we consider as scenarios in the stochastic market model. We determine their respective
probabilities according to the relative historical frequency of occurrence of the terciles. The chosen years and
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probabilities of occurrence are summarised in Table 5.
Table 5: Representative years chosen for RES scenarios and corresponding probabilities of occurrence.
Year 2003 2004 2015 2001 1983 1998
Probability of occurrence 0.086 0.029 0.029 0.086 0.486 0.286
3.1.4. Use of regional RES generation data in stochastic market model
The procedure described in the previous section leaves us with six hourly time-series (scenarios) each for
wind and PV for each of the eight NUTS3 regions in the Republic of Ireland. For computational regions,
we aggregate these eight NUTS3 regions to three larger regions (see Table 6). In the stochastic market
model, we consider the wind generation profiles of these three regions as different wind technologies (Wind
1-3). Since our analysis shows that the regional variations between RES generation profiles is much lower
for PV as opposed to wind and the installed capacity of solar PV is much lower, we aggregate the regional
PV generation profiles to just one region for Ireland. For the electricity generation of both wind and PV, we
consider a FIP payment of Xt = X
PV = 23 e/MWhel which we obtain from Devine et al. (2017). We do
not consider a FIP for any other technology. For both wind and solar we assume a marginal generating cost
of zero.
Table 6: Aggregation of NUTS3 regions for consideration of RES technologies in market model.
Aggregated Region Associated NUTS3 statistical regions Technology name in model
Region 1 (North-West) Border, West Wind 1
Region 2 (South-West) Mid-West, South-West Wind 2
Region 3 (South-East) Dublin, South-East, Midland, Mid-East Wind 3
3.2. Conventional power generation data
On the supply side, we consider five power generating firms with different generation portfolios, i.e. a
specialised baseload, mid merit and peakload firm each as well as a specialised RES firm and an integrated
firm with generation capacity across all considered technologies. The maximum capacity values for each
technology are broadly based on EirGrid (2016). The breakdown of initially installed capacity by technology
and firm is summarised in Table 7. As part of the study, we look at the firms’ investment decisions in new
generating capacity. Initially, however, we assume that the firms do not have any of these new technologies
in their portfolio (see Table 7).
As described in section 2.1, our model considers quadratic cost functions for the conventional generators,
i.e. the marginal costs at the intercept increase with the power output of each generator according to the
marginal cost slope BGENt = 0.000213, which we assume based on Grigg (1996).
To calculate marginal power generation costs at the intercept, we assume power plant efficiencies of
30% for existing baseload generators, 50% for existing mid merit generators and 32% for existing peakload
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Table 7: Initial power generation portfolio by firm (CAPf,t).
Technology firm 1 firm 2 firm 3 firm 4 firm 5
Existing baseload (MW) 1947 1940 - - -
Existing mid merit (MW) 512 - 404 - -
Existing peakload (MW) 270 - - 234 -
New baseload (MW) 0 0 0 0 0
New mid merit (MW) 0 0 0 0 0
New peakload (MW) 0 0 0 0 0
Wind 1 (MW) 775 0 0 0 775
Wind 2 (MW) 964 0 0 0 964
Wind 3 (MW) 661 0 0 0 661
generators. Note that in an Irish context, these efficiencies may lead to existing baseload generation having
higher variable power generation costs than existing mid merit generators. To calculate marginal costs of
the new investment technologies at the intercept, we assume efficiencies of 45% for baseload, 60% for mid
merit and 40% for peakload and specific investment costs as in Table 8. The marginal costs in Table 8 were
calculated using coal, gas and CO2 prices of the corresponding futures markets for 2017 as obtained from
the European Energy Exchange (www.eex.com). For this purpose, we used the average market results of the
futures markets for 2017 as traded during 2016. We use coal and CO2 prices to calculate variable generation
costs of baseload generation, while gas and CO2 prices are used for determining the variable costs of mid
merit and peakload generation, i.e. mid merit generators are assumed to be combined cycle gas turbines
(CCGT), while peakload generators are assumed to be open cycle gas turbines.
Table 8: Summary of techno-economic input data of considered supply side technologies.
Technology Annuity of spe-
cific invest
Fixed O& M
costs
Marginal power
gen. costs at
intercept
Spec. CO2 emis-
sions
(ICGENt ) (MTCt) (A
GEN
t ) -
(e/MW y) (e/MW y) (e/MWhel) (t CO2/MWhel)
Existing baseload - 41,667 48.87 1.17
Existing mid merit - 27,778 41.10 0.36
Existing peakload - 23,148 63.38 0.56
New baseload 110,769 41,667 31.58 0.78
New mid merit 67,268 27,778 34.00 0.30
New peakload 40,363 23,148 50.50 0.45
Wind 103,014 28,000 0 0
3.3. Demand side data
We consider four different consumer groups on the demand side. These include commercial/industrial
as well as residential consumers and within each of these, we distinguish between traditional consumers and
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prosumers, i.e. consumers that have their own generation from solar PV modules. While the model described
in section 2 is also capable of considering prosumers with thermal micro generation, we restrict our analysis
in the case study to prosumers with PV generation. Figure 4 shows the reference demand profiles of the
industrial and residential consumer groups on a typical day, which reveals that the residential demand profile
is less flat (the peak is more pronounced) than the industrial one. Based on EirGrid (2016), we consider
an overall annual electricity demand of 33.6 TWh and a peak demand of 5655 MW. Similar to Nolan et al.
(2017), we calculate the capacity target as 1.2 times the system peak demand, i.e. TARGET = 1.2 × 5655
MW = 6786 MW.
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Figure 4: Reference demand of industrial and residential consumers on a typical day
In this study, we use the reference demand shown in Figure 4 as a baseline and explore the impact of
shifting a share of the overall demand in time. The assumptions for load shifting are based on Gils (2014),
who reports shiftable load values per hour for Ireland of approximately 10% of the peak demand for industrial
and residential consumers. In addition to load shifting, we allow consumers to shed parts of their load. We use
values for sheddable load based on Gils (2014) and parameters for the marginal load shedding cost functions
(4) from Devine and Bertsch (2017). Devine and Bertsch (2017) use value of lost load (VOLL) estimates by
Leahy and Tol (2011) for different types of consumers in Ireland to derive load shedding cost functions for
industrial and residential consumers.
4. Results
Below, we now present the results of our study focussing on the impact of DR on generators’ investment
decisions and profits from different markets, on costs to different consumers from different markets and on
CO2 emissions. When presenting the results, we focus on the impact of load shifting within demand response.
While we also allow consumers to shed parts of their load as described in the previous section, they do not
choose to do so in the considered case study. This can be explained as follows: we model all generators as
price-takers in this paper and consider a quantity-based capacity market. Together, this leads to avoiding
very high price peaks, which is why consumers prefer not to shed any load for the parameters of the case
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study. Section 4.1 presents the results when a FIP is available before section 4.2 summarises the results in
absence of a FIP. Subsequently, section 4.3 presents our findings in relation to the value of using a stochastic
optimisation approach.
4.1. Findings in the presence of a feed-in premium
In the case, where a FIP is available, Figure 5 shows that generators invest in almost 1500 MW new mid
merit capacity, which is mainly driven by the quantity target in the capacity market. There are no exits
of existing capacity. Moreover, generators invest in over 1000 MW new wind capacity, which contributes
to maximising their profits because of revenues from the energy market and the FIP. When load shifting is
possible, the investment in wind is 100 MW higher than in the case without shifting. This suggests that load
shifting helps integrate higher amounts of wind into the system. Other investment decisions are not affected
by load shifting in this case.
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Figure 5: Existing capacity and new investments (in presence of FIP)
Figure 6 (a) shows that all firms’ profits increase when load shifting is possible. The increase of the total
profits across all firms corresponds to approximately 4%. Firms 1 and 5 benefit most, which can be mainly
explained by increasing profits of wind generation. In part, these are a result of higher offpeak prices. In
addition, load shifting leads to lower wind curtailment and higher wind investment, both of which increase
the quantity of wind generation in the market. This higher quantity leads to higher profits from the energy
market and FIP revenues. Since firm 1 is the only firm to invest in new wind generation, we can conclude that
the profit increase of firm 5 is a result of reduced wind curtailment and higher offpeak prices only. Moreover,
firms 1 and 2 can increase their capacity market revenues. Figure 6 (b) reveals that this increase is mainly
earned by their baseload generation. While the installed baseload capacity does not change, there is a slight
increase in the capacity price. This, in turn, is a direct impact of decreasing profits of the baseload generators
in the energy market (Figure 6 (b)) when shifting is possible. Existing baseload generators have the highest
variable power generation costs in our case study based on the Irish power system with the exception of peak
load generators, where the latter are rarely needed to clear the energy market. Therefore, load shifting has
a negative impact on existing baseload generation through slightly lower peak prices and through reducing
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the volume they need to generate (see Figure 9 (a) below). Since we assume a competitive, quantity-based
capacity market, this leads to a capacity price increase.
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Figure 6: Generator profits (in presence of FIP)
The expected price effects in the energy market referred to above are shown in Figure 7. The solid black
line shows the price duration curve (energy market prices for each of the 8,760 hours of the year sorted in
decreasing order) in the presence of a FIP when no shifting is possible. As shown by the dashed black line,
load shifting leads to higher prices during low-price hours (right side of the diagram) and slightly lower prices
during high-price hours (left side of the diagram). In addition, Figure 7 shows an asymmetry between price
increase in offpeak and price decrease in peak hours. However, it is this price increase in offpeak hours (which
is a result of the load increase in these hours resulting from load shifting) that contributes to the increased
profits of renewable power generation.
Figure 8 (a) shows how load shifting changes the costs to consumers from different markets. In general,
consumers are exposed to three different cost categories: energy costs, capacity costs and FIP costs. As
expected, the energy costs decrease from 1,156 Million e(without shifting) to 1,138 Million e(with shifting),
which corresponds to a change of -1.5%. At the same time, however, capacity costs and FIP costs increase
and, together, slightly overcompensate the savings on energy costs. Altogether, this leads to an unexpected
consumer cost increase of 0.1%. The capacity cost increase can be explained by an increase in the capacity
price resulting from decreasing profits in the energy market of the marginal generator required to meet the
capacity quantity target (see Figure 6 (b) above). The increase in FIP costs can be explained by an increase
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Figure 7: Price duration curves with and without shifting in presence and absence of FIP
in wind generation when shifting is possible. This increase results from (i) a reduced curtailment of wind
generation with shifting and (ii) from an increased investment in wind (see Figure 5).
Figure 8 (b) shows the breakdown of the relative savings by consumer group. While all consumer groups
are similarly exposed to the increase in capacity and FIP costs, the savings on costs from the energy market
differ between the consumer groups. While industrial consumers only save around 0.5% on energy costs,
residential consumers save around 4%. This can be explained by the different load profiles of these consumers.
Industrial consumers have a rather flat load profile throughout the day, whereas the load of the residential
consumers correlates more strongly with the system level load and, hence, the prices in the energy market.
In other words, because of the asymmetry between price reduction of shifting during peak hours and price
increase during offpeak hours (see Figure 7), residential consumers have a higher benefit from shifting load
from peak to offpeak hours. Another observation from Figure 8 (b) is that prosumers (those consumers with
their own PV generation) have slightly higher benefits from shifting. Load shifting helps these consumers
increase their self-consumption which leads to additional savings. Altogether, the effects with respect to
the different cost categories lead to around 0.8% cost increase for industrial consumers, while residential
consumers save around 1.2%.
Figure 9 shows the impact of load shifting on power generation by technology (a) and on emissions by
technology (b). While load shifting can increase the total wind generation in the system by 4%, baseload
generation is reduced by 25%. Again, the increase in wind generation is a combination of a higher investment
in and a lower curtailment of wind power. Furthermore, the power generation from new and existing mid merit
generators is increased by 2-3% under load shifting. These shifts in power generation between technologies
are also reflected in the impact of load shifting on emissions by technology. While emissions of new and
existing mid merit generators increase slightly, emissions from existing baseload generation are reduced by
25% resulting in a total emission reduction effect of load shifting of 11%.
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Figure 8: Consumer costs (in presence of FIP)
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4.2. Findings in the absence of a feed-in premium
We now turn to the results when no FIP is available to the RES generators. Figure 10 shows that, as
opposed to the case where a FIP is available, generators do not invest in new wind generation capacity at
all. Moreover, generators invest in more than 1600 MW new mid merit capacity (slightly more than in the
case where a FIP is available), while around 200 MW of existing baseload capacity are decommissioned. It is
interesting to observe that, when there is no FIP, the investment in new mid merit and the decommissioning
of existing baseload increase by 18 MW when shifting is possible compared to the case without shifting. This
suggests that load shifting changes the residual demand profile in a way that makes the expensive existing
baseload generation less profitable and new mid merit generation more profitable (which is supported by the
solid and dashed red lines in Figure 7).
Figure 11 (a) shows that the profits of all firms increase when load shifting is possible similar to the case
when a FIP is available. The increase of the total profits across all firms corresponds to approximately 7%
in this case. Again, firms 1 and 5 benefit most because of increasing revenues of their wind generators (see
Figure 11 (b)). Since there is no FIP and no investment in new wind capacity, the increased revenues can
be explained exclusively by lower curtailment and higher offpeak prices (see the red lines in Figure 7) in the
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Figure 10: Existing capacity and new investments (in absence of FIP)
energy market when shifting is possible. Moreover, the profits of firms 3 and 4 increase slightly, which is a
result of the slightly higher investment in and increased profits from new mid merit when shifting is possible
(which is supported by Figure 11 (b)). The profits of firm 2 also increase as a result of investing in new mid
merit. However, the positive impact on the firm’s profits is partly compensated by decreased revenues from
the capacity market. While the capacity price is the same with and without shifting in the case without a
FIP, this revenue decrease is a result of the decommissioning of existing baseload capacity by firm 2.
Comparing the profit changes between the cases with and without a FIP, one finds that the revenue
increase in the energy market resulting from shifting is higher when no FIP is available. This can be
explained by a higher increase of offpeak prices by shifting in the absence of a FIP (see difference between
solid and dashed red lines as opposed to the difference between the black lines in Figure 7). Nevertheless,
the overall impact on profits is larger in presence of a FIP because of the FIP-related revenues. We also find
that the presence of a FIP increases the total profits of all firms by around 25%.
Figure 12 (a) illustrates the impact of load shifting on costs to consumers. As mentioned in the context of
the generators’ profits, the capacity price does not change between shifting and no shifting so that the costs
from the capacity market stay constant. Interestingly, however, the costs from the energy market increase
slightly when shifting is possible as opposed to the case with a FIP where load shifting lead to slightly
decreased costs from the energy market. This is a result of the increase in offpeak prices when shifting is
possible (see red lines in Figure 7) and the asymmetry between price increase and offpeak hours and decrease
in peak hours.
Comparing the costs to all consumers between the case without a FIP (Figure 12 (a)) and the case where
a FIP is available (Figure 8 (a)), shows that the costs from the energy market are around 200 Million elower
when a FIP is available. This is mainly driven by higher levels of wind generation which leads to lower prices
in the energy market (see black lines compared to red lines in Figure 7). However, this price effect of wind
generation is overcompensated by higher capacity market costs and, most importantly, the costs of the FIP.
Comparing the total costs to consumers between the cases with and without a FIP shows that consumers
have to pay around 200 Million emore in the case with a FIP.
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a)  Profits by firm b)  Profits by technology 
Figure 11: Generator profits (in absence of FIP)
Figure 12 (b) shows the breakdown of the effects of load shifting by consumer group. Similar to the case
with a FIP, Figure 12 (b) reveals that industrial consumers’ costs increase when shifting is possible, while we
note small savings for residential consumers. Again, this can be explained by the different load profiles of the
different consumer groups. The cost increase for industrial consumers is almost the same as in the case with
a FIP. For residential consumers, however, the savings of shifting are much lower when no FIP is available.
Finally, we observe that savings of residential consumers with their own PV generation are slightly higher
(and the cost increase of industrial consumers with PV is slightly lower), which, again, shows that shifting
can help increase self-consumption.
In the absence of a FIP, Figure 13 illustrates how load shifting affects the power generation by technology
(a) and emissions by technology (b). In this case, load shifting can increase the wind generation in the system
by 2%, while the generation of existing baseload capacity is decreased by 29%. Generation of existing as well
as new mid merit capacity increases by 5% each. Since there is no investment in new wind, the increase in
wind generation is a result of reduced curtailment only. The shifts in power generation by technology are
reflected in the emissions by technology in a similar way. Emissions from baseload generation decrease by
29% while emissions from existing and new mid merit generation increase by 5% each. Overall, load shifting
results in an emission reduction of 10% in this case.
Comparing the total CO2 emissions between the cases with (Figure 9 (b)) and without a FIP (Figure 13
(b)) shows that emissions in the presence of a FIP are slightly less than 1 Million t CO2 lower than those
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Figure 12: Consumer costs (in absence of FIP)
in the absence of a FIP. However, as mentioned above, this emission reduction comes at a cost increase to
consumers of almost 200 Million e.
Emissions (in abs nce of FIP) 
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4.3. Value of stochastic solution and expected value of perfect information for the considered case study
In order to demonstrate the value of employing a stochastic optimisation approach, we calculate well-
known metrics in stochastic programming: the Value of Stochastic Solution (VSS) and the Expected Value of
Perfect Information (EVPI) (see Birge and Louveaux, 2011, for details). We calculate these values separately
for firms and consumers.
The VSS measures the cost of considering expected values in a deterministic optimisation instead of
adopting a stochastic approach. For the generation firms, its value was found to be -e127,330,403, which
is 21% of the corresponding costs associated with the stochastic optimisation, i.e.,the firms’ profits are 21%
higher when considering expected values compared to the stochastic solution. While this suggests firms do
better in the presence of expected values, the VSS for the consumers is e25,323,723, which corresponds to
2% of the costs of the stochastic solution, i.e., their costs would increase when considering expected values.
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In particular, there would be a strong increase in consumer costs from the capacity market. This can be
explained as follows: using expected values leads firms to naively believe that there is no uncertainty in
the capacity factor for wind. As a result, we observe higher investments in new wind power. This leads to
lower investments in new mid merit generation and some investments in new peak load generation. However,
because of the higher penetration of wind power, the thermal generation is less profitable in the energy
market, which drives up the price in the capacity market and therefore leads to a cost increase for consumers.
The EVPI measures the costs of not having perfect information or, in other words, the amount players
would be willing to pay for perfect information. For the firms, the EVPIs value was found to be e48,449,717
which corresponds to 8% of the profits associated with the stochastic solution, where, as expected, the firms’
profits would increase by 8% if they had perfect information. Consequently, the EVPI for the consumers
was found to be -e49,136,878, which corresponds to 3% of the costs associated with the stochastic solution,
where their costs would be 3% higher if all players had perfect information. Again, this result is largely driven
by the effects in the capacity market. Altogether, these findings underline the importance of employing a
stochastic optimisation approach, in particular from a consumer perspective.
5. Discussion
In relation to our research objectives set out in section 1, we can summarise five main findings of the
research presented in this paper.
First, load shifting provides incentives for increased investments in low marginal cost generation capacities.
In the case where a FIP is available, this low marginal cost generation is wind power, in the case without
a FIP, it is new mid merit generation. Moreover, load shifting increases generators’ profits, particularly
of RES generators, because it increases offpeak prices. Note that we do not observe any investment in
new baseload generators despite the fact that their marginal power generation costs are the lowest of the
thermal technologies. This suggests that the level of wind penetration reduces the capacity factors of thermal
generation to an extent where the investment costs of baseload generation are simply too high to make this
a profitable investment.
Second, in contrast to conventional wisdom, we find that load shifting does not decrease costs to con-
sumers per se. On the one hand, while costs from the energy market may decrease, this decrease may be
(over)compensated by increasing costs from the capacity market and FIP. On the other hand, it is impor-
tant to distinguish between different consumer groups. While we generally observe a slight cost decrease for
residential consumers, costs for industrial consumers increase slightly because of their different load profiles.
Third, we find that load shifting helps reduce CO2 emissions in our case study. This reduction results
from different effects. On the one hand, shifting helps integrate RES generation by reducing curtailment and,
in the case where a FIP is available, by increasing investment in wind generation. On the other hand, the
existing baseload generators have the highest marginal costs (except peak generators which are hardly needed)
and the highest specific CO2 emissions in our case study. Load shifting therefore reduces the volume that
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needs to be supplied by these generators and replaces this by cheaper existing and new mid merit generation.
However, we acknowledge that the latter emission reduction effect largely depends on the underlying power
system.
Fourth, the presence of a FIP has a strong impact on how load shifting changes profits, consumer costs
and emissions. While the absolute impact of load shifting on consumer costs and generator profits is slightly
higher in the absence of a FIP compared to the case where a FIP is available, the absolute impact of shifting
on emissions remains unchanged.
Fifth, the calculated VSS and EVPI provide proof that it is advisable to use a stochastic optimisation
approach in the considered case study. Incorporating the stochasticity of renewable generation into the model
more realistically replicates the uncertainty that the market participants face when making decisions. The
results obtained therefore replicate real-world markets and decisions more convincingly.
Concerning the impact of DR on consumer costs, our estimated savings for residential consumers of 1-4%
correspond to e3-7 Million across all private households in Ireland for one year. Assuming approximately
1.5 Million households, we find annual savings of e2-5/household. Note that these estimates do not consider
any costs for metering/controlling infrastructure. Of course, the exact results are largely driven by the model
input data and need to be interpreted with some caution. However, another important reason for these
results is that our analysis does not just focus on the energy market. In contrast, we consider interactions
between the energy market, the capacity market and a FIP payment mechanism. And, methodologically,
our results demonstrate the importance of considering these interactions since savings in one market can be
(over)compensated by cost increases from other markets.
Comparing our results to other findings internationally as reported in the literature we find that Feuerriegel
and Neumann (2016), for instance, report similar savings of approximately 3% for Germany. Note that their
estimate does not include infrastructure investments either and Feuerriegel et al. (2016) conclude that those
capital expenditures can hardly be recovered from the savings. In a study conducted in the US, Allcott
(2011) finds an average welfare increase for residential consumers of around US$ 10/year, which corresponds
to around 1-2% of their electricity costs. He similarly concludes that this is insufficient to justify any
investment in metering infrastructure.
However, as shown in this paper there are benefits of DR in terms of RES integration and emission
reduction. In addition, Zarnikau and Hallett (2008) and Walawalkar et al. (2008) argue that DR limits the
possibility of generators to exert market power, while Zarnikau (2010) more widely discusses the benefits of
DR in terms of generally increasing market efficiency and competitiveness.
Should policy makers wish to avail of these potential benefits, our results and those of others show that
they should be aware that there is little economic incentive for consumers to participate in DR programmes
or even invest in new metering infrastructure. We acknowledge that the value of load shifting can be expected
to be higher in scarcity situations, in particular in the presence of market power. With a quantity-based
capacity market in place (as in Ireland in the future), however, scarcity situations can be expected to be
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rather rare. Other mechanisms would therefore be required to incentivise consumers to participate in DR
programmes and realise any potential benefits.
Another interesting finding from our study is that the presence of a FIP (which we assume at a level of 23
e/MWh on the basis of Devine et al. (2017)) increases both generator profits and consumer costs by around
e150-200 Million. At the same time, CO2 emissions are reduced by slightly less than 1 Million tonnes only.
Beyond the impact of demand response, this is an interesting finding for policy makers, raising the question
whether higher levels of emission reduction could be achieved at the same costs through mechanisms other
than a FIP for RES-E.
Critically reflecting our approach, we wish to acknowledge that we modelled all firms as price-takers in
this paper. Considering price-making behaviour would lead to increased electricity prices, particularly during
peak times. Therefore, price-making behaviour can have an impact on investment and operating decisions of
all market participants and would also increase the value of demand response. Moreover, while the input data
are based on actual data of the Irish power system, the case study has a stylised character. In addition, we
did not consider any investment decisions by the consumers (i.e., in solar PV generation or battery storage)
nor did we consider any behavioural aspects related to consumer decisions. Finally, the model in this paper
considers investment decisions in a one-period framework; extending the model to a multi-period game would
be very interesting, for instance to yield insights in relation to the timing of investments.
6. Conclusions
In this work we develop a novel stochastic, game-theoretic equilibrium model that allows us to investigate
how demand response affects generator investment decisions and profits, how it affects the costs for different
consumers, and how it affects CO2 emissions. While existing work usually focusses on the effects in energy
markets, the model developed also allows us to focus on the interactions between the energy market, a
quantity-based capacity market and a feed-in premium for renewable electricity generation. We also analyse
how the presence of a feed-in premium changes the impact of demand response and what the benefits of
adopting a stochastic optimisation approach are.
For our case study based on the future Irish power system, we find that demand response increases
profits particularly of renewable generators. We also find that demand response may decrease consumer
costs from the energy market but that, in the presence of a feed-in premium for renewables, these savings
are (over)compensated by increasing costs from the capacity market and the feed-in premium. This finding
underlines the importance of considering interactions between the different markets. Altogether, the savings
of residential consumers amount to 1-4%, while the costs of industrial consumers increase by approximately
1%. Consumers with their own solar PV generation generally have slightly higher benefits. By reducing
curtailment of renewable generation and replacing emission-intensive generation with less emission-intensive
generation, demand response helps reduce CO2 emissions by 10-11%. However, the small savings of residential
consumers do not provide any economic incentive for investing in new metering infrastructure. While the
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exact values depend largely on the model input data, these findings demonstrate that policy makers need to
think about additional/alternative incentive mechanisms should they wish to harness any potential benefits
of demand response.
While the presence of a feed-in premium for renewable generation would increase investment in wind
power and therefore reduce CO2 emissions by almost 1 Million tonnes per year, it would increase the annual
costs to consumers by almost e200 Million. This suggests that there might be alternatives to achieve more
emission reduction at the same costs.
Future research in this area should take into account the effects of price-making behaviour. Moreover,
investment decisions by consumers, e.g., in solar PV generation or battery storage, should be considered. Last
but not least, the extension of the model from a one-period to a multi-period game would reveal interesting
insights in terms of the timing of investments.
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Appendix A. Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions
This appendix presents the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for optimality for the two types of
players modelled in this work. These conditions, along with the market clearing conditions (6), make up
the mixed complementarity problem. The ‘perp’ notation 0 ≤ a ⊥ b ≥ 0 is equivalent to a ≥ 0, b ≥ 0 and
a.b = 0.
Appendix A.1. Firms’ KKT conditions
The firms’ KKT conditions are
0 ≤ genf,t,p,s ⊥ −PRs
(
γp,s +Xt −
∂CGENf,t
∂genf,t,p,s
)
+ λ1f,t,p,s ≥ 0, ∀f, t, p, s, (A.1)
0 ≤ invf,t ⊥ ICGENt +MTCGENt −
∑
p,s
NORMGf,t,p,sλ
1
f,t,p,s − λ2f,t ≥ 0, ∀f, t, (A.2)
0 ≤ exitf,t ⊥ −MTCGENt +
∑
p,s
NORMGf,t,p,sλ
1
f,t,p,s + λ
2
f,t ≥ 0, ∀f, t, (A.3)
0 ≤ capbidf,t ⊥ DRt × κ+ λ2f,t ≥ 0, ∀f, t, (A.4)
0 ≤ λ1f,t,p,s ⊥ −genf,t,p,s + (CAPf,t + invf,t − exitf,t)×NORMGf,t,p,s ≥ 0, ∀f, t, p, s, (A.5)
0 ≤ λ2f,t ⊥ −capbidf,t + CAPf,t + invf,t − exitf,t ≥ 0, ∀f, t. (A.6)
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Appendix A.2. Consumers’ KKT conditions
The consumers’ KKT conditions are
0 ≤ glsk,p,s ⊥ −PRs
(
γp,s −
∂CLSk,p
∂glsk,p,s
)
+ µ1k,p,s + µ
8
k,p,s ≥ 0, ∀k, p, s, (A.7)
0 ≤ gupk,p,s ⊥ PRsγp,s + µ2k,p,s +
|H|∑
e=p−pˆ+1
(
µ6k,pˆ,e,s − µ7k,pˆ,e,s
)− µ8k,p,s ≥ 0, ∀k, p, s, (A.8)
0 ≤ gdownk,p,s ⊥ −PRsγp,s + µ3k,p,s −
|H|∑
e=p−pˆ+1
(
µ6k,pˆ,e,s − µ7k,pˆ,e,s
)
+ (1− LOSSk)µ8k,p,s ≥ 0,∀k, p, s,(A.9)
where
pˆ = max{p′|pˆ ≤ p},
0 ≤ gmicrok,p,s ⊥ −PRs
(
γp,s −
∂CMICROk,p
∂gmicrok,p,s
)
+ µ4k,p,s + µ
8
k,p,s ≥ 0, ∀k, p, s, (A.10)
0 ≤ gpvk,p,s ⊥ −PRs
(
γp,s +X
PV − CPVk,p
)
+ µ5k,p,s + µ
8
k,p,s ≥ 0, ∀k, p, s, (A.11)
0 ≤ µ1k,p,s ⊥ −glsk,p,s +GLS,MAXk ≥ 0 ∀k, p, s, (A.12)
0 ≤ µ2k,p,s ⊥ −gupk,p,s + FACSTORk × INT STORk ≥ 0 ∀k, p, s, (A.13)
0 ≤ µ3k,p,s ⊥ −gdownk,p,s + FACSTORk × INT STORk ≥ 0 ∀k, p, s, (A.14)
0 ≤ µ4k,p,s ⊥ −gmicrok,p,s + INTMICROk ≥ 0 ∀k, p, s, (A.15)
0 ≤ µ5k,p,s ⊥ −gpvk,p,s + INTPVk ×NORMPVp,s ≥ 0 ∀k, p, s, (A.16)
0 ≤ µ6k,p′,h,s ⊥ −
p′+h−1∑
e=p′
(
gupk,e,s − gdownk,e,s
)
+ INT STORk ≥ 0 ∀k, p′, s, h, (A.17)
0 ≤ µ7k,p′,h,s ⊥
p′+h−1∑
e=p′
(
gupk,e,s − gdownk,e,s
) ≥ 0 ∀k, p′, s, h, (A.18)
0 ≤ µ8k,p,s ⊥ −glsk,p,s − (1− LOSSk)gdownk,p,s − gmicrok,p,s − gpvk,p,s +DREFk,p + gupk,p,s ≥ 0 ∀k, p, s. (A.19)
Appendix B. Benders Decomposition
In this appendix we detail the pseudo-code for the Benders Decomposition algorithm, its associated master
problem and, in addition, the algorithm’s convergence metric. The sub-problems solved can be represented
by the MCP presented in Section 2 but with the first-stage variables fixed, as explained in Section 2.4. At
each iteration, that MCP is solved twelve times, each time representing a different 48-hour period and sub-
problem. As explained in Section 2.4, these twelve 48-hour periods represent a week in winter, spring/autumn
and summer.
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The revenues and costs are weighted such that they represent a full year. Furthermore, each sub-problem
is solved with the first-stage decision variables fixed at the values determined by the master problem of the
same iteration.
Appendix B.1. Algorithm
In this appendix we present the pseudo-code for the Benders Decomposition algorithm.
Read dataset;
Define Master Problem MCP;
Define sub-problem MCP;
for i = 1 → 1000 do
if i = 1 then
Set all Master Problem variables to zero;
end
else
Solve Master Problem;
if Solution is found then
BREAK
end
else
Set all Master Problem variables to zero;
Remove benders cuts that have not been binding for at least 10 iterations ;
end
end
Solve sub-problems ;
if i > 1 then
Calculate convergence metric TOLi ;
end
if TOLi > −10−4 then
BREAK ;
end
end
OutputData;
Algorithm 1: Benders Decomposition Algorithim
Appendix B.2. KKT conditions for master problem of ith iteration
In this appendix we present the KKT conditions for the master problem MCP, solved at the ith iteration
of the Benders Decomposition algorithm. All variables with an index i in these conditions are exogenous to
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the master problem and are determined by the sub-problems solved at the ith iteration. For example, λ1,if,t,p,s
is equal to the value of λ1f,t,p,s obtained at the ith iteration.
Equations (B.1) - (B.4) correspond to equations (A.2) - (A.4) and equation (A.6) respectively, while
equation (B.5) corresponds to market clearing condition (6b). Equation (B.6) is the convexity constraint
(Egging, 2013), while equation (B.7) represents the Benders cuts.
The KKT conditions for the MCP master problem are:
0 ≤ invf,t ⊥ ICGENt +MTCGENt −
∑
ıˆ≤i
θıˆ
(∑
p,s
NORMGf,t,p,sλ
1,ˆı
f,t,p,s
)
− λ2f,t ≥ 0, ∀f, t, (B.1)
0 ≤ exitf,t ⊥ −MTCGENt +
∑
ıˆ≤i
θıˆ
(∑
p,s
NORMGf,t,p,sλ
1,ˆı
f,t,p,s
)
+ λ2f,t ≥ 0, ∀f, t, (B.2)
0 ≤ capbidf,t ⊥ DRt × κ+ λ2f,t ≥ 0, ∀f, t, (B.3)
0 ≤ λ2f,t ⊥ −capbidf,t + CAPf,t + invf,t − exitf,t ≥ 0, ∀f, t, (B.4)
0 =
∑
f,t
DRt × capbidf,t − TARGET, (κ, free), (B.5)
0 =
∑
ıˆ≤i
θıˆ − 1, (α, free), (B.6)
0 ≤ θıˆ ⊥ α+
∑
f,t,p,s
(
PRs
(
2BGENt × genıˆf,t,p,s
)×∑
ı¯≤i
(
θı¯ × genı¯f,t,p,s
))
+
∑
f,t,p,s
λ1,ˆıf,t,p,s × (CAPf,t + invf,t − exitf,t)×NORMGf,t,p,s
+
∑
k,p,s
(
PRs × 2BLSk,p × gls,ˆık,p,s
)
×
∑
ı¯≤i
(
θı¯ × gls,¯ık,p,s
)
+
∑
k,p,s
(
PRs × 2BMICROk,p × gmicro,ˆık,p,s
)
×
∑
ı¯≤i
(
θı¯ × gmicro,¯ık,p,s
)
+
∑
k,p,s
(
µ1,ˆık,p,s ×GLS,MAXk + µ2,ˆık,p,s × FACSTORk × INT STORk + µ3,ˆık,p,s × FACSTORk × INT STORk
+µ4,ˆık,p,s × INTMICROk + µ5,ˆık,p,s ×NORMPVp,s × INTPVk + µ6,ˆık,p,s × INT STORk
+
(
µ8,ˆık,p,s + γ
ıˆ
p,s
)×DREFk,p ) ≥ 0, ∀ıˆ ≤ i. (B.7)
Appendix B.3. Convergence metric
In this appendix the convergence metric for the Benders Decomposition algorithm is presented. It follows
from the metric derived in Gabriel and Fuller (2010) Note: each variable with an index M is determined
from its corresponding variables with i indices as follows:
xM,i =
∑
ıˆ≤i
θıˆxıˆ. (B.8)
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The convergence metric is:
TOLi =
∑
f,t,p,s
PRs
(
2BGENt ×
(
genif,t,p,s − genM,if,t,p,s
))× genM,if,t,p,s
+
∑
f,t,p,s
(
λ1,if,t,p,s − λ1,M,if,t,p,s
)× (CAPf,t + invf,t − exitf,t)×NORMGf,t,p,s
+
∑
k,p,s
(
PRs × 2BLSk,p ×
(
gls,ik,p,s − gls,M,ik,p,s
))× gls,M,ik,p,s
+
∑
k,p,s
(
PRs × 2BMICROk,p ×
(
gmicro,ik,p,s − gmicro,M,ik,p,s
))× gmicro,M,ik,p,s
+
∑
k,p,s
((
µ1,ik,p,s − µ1,M,ik,p,s
)×GLS,MAXk + (µ2,ik,p,s − µ2,M,ik,p,s )× FACSTORk × INT STORk
+
(
µ3,ik,p,s − µ3,M,ik,p,s
)× FACSTORk × INT STORk + (µ4,ik,p,s − µ4,M,ik,p,s )× INTMICROk
+
(
µ5,ik,p,s − µ5,M,ik,p,s
)×NORMPVp,s × INTPVk + (µ6,ik,p,s − µ6,M,ik,p,s )× INT STORk
+
(
µ8,ik,p,s − µ8,M,ik,p,s + γip,s − γM,ip,s
)×DREFk,p ). (B.9)
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